This time is different
The Monsoon Revolution has put Bangladesh in truly uncharted waters
Whether it is economics and finance, sports, or politics, pundits often tend to look at the past trends and patterns to draw lessons for the present, and extrapolate future projections. While past performance is never an accurate guide to future, often there are regularities that can be relied upon to reasonably confidently proclaim that this time is no different. There are, however, times when the past offer limited guidance. This is particularly the case for major political junctures. And Bangladesh is at such a critical juncture now where relying on the past can potentially mislead us.
For example, let’s consider the last time Bangladesh had a military-backed non-partisan government. After weeks of political deadlock, on 11 January 2007, the then army chief and other senior officers walked into Bangabhaban and asked the president to declare a state of emergency and appoint a technocratic government. This was followed by arrests of politicians, including the chiefs of both major parties, brief talks of a new political party to be headed by Professor Yunus, further talks of the army chief entering politics, and a prolonged period of uncertainty which ended with the election of December 2008.
Superficial similarities notwithstanding, this time is not like the post-1/11 situation.
Whereas Gen Moeen U Ahmed’s forced the president to go on TV and do his bidding, Gen Wakar-uz-Zaman fronted the camera on 5 August after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had resigned and fled the country. This was not a military coup, soft or otherwise. It didn’t happen after the political parties reached a stalemate on the streets. It happened after a popular uprising made Hasina’s presence in Ganabhaban, perhaps in the country, untenable. The context here is entirely different from what happened in January 2007.
Further, it was the student leaders who spearheaded the uprising that demanded Professor Yunus assume power, to which all the democratic parties and the army assented, seemingly unanimously. If the interim administration stays around for much longer than the 90 days or a new party is floated, it will also be quite different from the ill-fated minus-2 attempt of 2007-08. This is because it is Sheikh Hasina herself who had minussed politics out of the country over the past decade by rigging three consecutive elections and staying in power by relying on the security forces who killed, abducted and tortured for her.
Anything Yunus does from hereon will lead to a restoration of politics, not the depoliticization that was attempted in 2007-08.
That said, Yunus is clearly not heading a caretaker government of the kind we had experienced in 1991, 1996 and 2001.
The first caretaker government was formed when HM Ershad resigned in December 1990. The framework for that government was laid out by the opposition parties that had been demanding his resignation —that he would appoint someone unanimously accepted by the democratic opposition, that person (Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed) would appoint a cabinet composed of individuals nominated by the political parties, and the only task for the caretakers would be to hold a free and fair election within 90 days. The model was incorporated into the constitution in 1996 and abolished by Hasina in 2011.
It is important to understand that we are not looking at an election in 90 days. This is not a normative statement. I am not arguing that elections should be delayed. This is a positive statement. The fact is that we are not looking at elections within 90 days.
There are two aspects to this.
First, it is not clear whether an election within 90 days is even feasible. The country was without a functioning police force for a week, and Dhaka resembled Gotham. Bangladesh experienced the greatest violence against civilians perpetrated by any regime in its history barring the Liberation War of 1971, with at least 650 dead by formal counts. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country hastily on a helicopter. This is the kind of stuff that leads to United Nations assuming governance in other parts of the world, and those post-conflict interim administrations last much longer than 90 days.
Indeed, Yunus and others have styled the administration as interim, not caretaker. The nomenclature here is important. This is a post-conflict government whose first task is to restore a modicum of civil administration before an election can be held. This will require not just shuffling bureaucrats around, but in fact an overhaul of the security apparatus, judiciary, and the upper echelon of the bureaucracy. This is a mammoth task, and Yunus has taken it upon himself to at least begin the process.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the students who spearheaded the uprising that toppled Hasina has demanded a long interim period before an election is held, and democratic parties have assented. Formally, there is no announcement on the tenure of the administration. The students have asked for three to six year, while BNP has said they will give the administration time to restore an environment conducive for election. Yunus himself has been mum. But the ground political reality is that there won’t be an election by 3 November.
This time is different from 1991, 1996 or 2001.
Better historical parallels might be 1969 or 1972, with very different implications.
In 1972, of course, we had a new country. Some pundits are calling for the establishment of a new republic, literally. But there is no indication that any key players —Yunus, the students, BNP or any other democratic party, or the army—want that. Rather, the aim seems to be to restore the existing republic and to reform it. And that takes us to 1969, when Ayub Khan resigned after a student-led popular uprising.
Ayub Khan was, of course, a much more benign dictator than Hasina, and his resignation was an orderly affair whereby he had handed over power to the army. On the other hand, the then Pakistan had much more intractable political problems than Bangladesh. So, Yahya Khan had a more complicated and yet easier task than Yunus. At least there is no reason to believe that Yunus will refuse to honor popular mandate after the election.
That is, hopefully this time will be different.
There is another, more ironic, historical parallel in comparing 2024 with 1969. It was after the 1968-69 uprising that the youth of Bangladesh had given Sheikh Mujibur Rahman the title of Bangabandhu, and the ensuing 1970 election saw the zenith of Awami League’s popularity. Because Hasina had built a cult of personality around Mujib, his statues became the symbols of the regime, and were demolished by the youth of today within hours after Hasina’s flight from Dhaka.
The conscious reader would have noticed that I keep referring to Hasina fleeing the country. This is because, ultimately, that is the most significant way this time is different.
The Hasina regime was fundamentally more repressive, more corrupt, more criminal, and more totalitarian than any in our history. It was also more centralized around her persona than any other government that came before. And its collapse has also been more total, more personalized than any other.
The ramifications of Hasina’s flight will be felt long after traffic cops are back on the beat in Dhaka. There is a political vacuum in the space that used to be taken by the Awami League. We have, of course, seen Muslim League, another once mighty governing party, wither after 1968‑69. Chances are that a similar fate awaits Awami League.
That is perhaps one way that this time is not different.
There is another historical parallel that is less discussed, and perhaps far more ominous for Bangladesh’s democracy.
When President Ziaur Rahman was assassinated in Chittagong on 30 May 1981, the then army chief Lt Gen HM Ershad affirmed his allegiance to the constitution. Justice Abdus Sattar, Zia’s septuagenarian vice president, assumed presidency and was duly elected in his own right later that year. Like Gen Zaman today, Ershad too was lauded for not being like the other power-hungry generals from our part of the world. Until he showed himself to be exactly that, of course!
Yunus enjoys support from all political stakeholders relevant in today’s Bangladesh. As an octogenarian, he is unlikely to develop the urge to stick around indefinitely. But he is also 84 years old, and Bangladesh’s challenges would overwhelm people half his age! And Gen Zaman has 34 months left in his term.
Here is hoping then that 2025-26 will not be like 1982!
Previously published in Nuraldeen.
Further reading
What to read and watch about Bangladesh
The Economist, 5 Jan 2024
Bangladesh PM faces tougher, more uncertain new term, analysts say
By Sudipto Ganguly and Ruma Paul, 8 Jan 2024
( … economist Jyoti Rahman said, however, the next term could be harder than ever….)
Catherine Davidson, 8 Jan 2024
Rehman Sobhan, 19 Jan 2024
Bangladesh is vexed by and wary of Modi’s unstinting support to Sheikh Hasina
Kamal Ahmed, 15 May 2024
Benjamin Parker and John Reed, 8 Aug 2024
Zillur Rahman, 9 Aug 2024
Eyewitness to History: A Journalist's Account of the Fall of Sheikh Hasina's Government
Yeasir Arafat, 11 Aug 2024
July Uprising: Understanding the nuances of post-uprising violence to unified resistance
Sohul Ahmed, 13 Aug 2024
ফারুক ওয়াসিফ, 13 Aug 2024
Ehteshamul Haque, 15 Aug 2024
After ousting Bangladesh's leader, Gen Z protesters are figuring out how to govern
Diaa Hadid and Ahmede Hussain, 16 Aug 2024
Students of BAF Shaheen College are writing their HSC exam. A classfriend is missing but will never be forgotten.
The problem is that we have a public sector banking crisis very similar to the one experienced by India in the early 2010s which the country has never recovered from. We also have to cut down energy subsidies and liberalise exchange rates as part of the IMF reforms. You can't go through with these reforms with a political mandate.
It's not all doom and gloom. Our public sector banks are less dominant than India's banking sector. Digital technologies is all enabling private banks to expand into rural credit markets.
Energy prices should be in long term decline in coming years softening the blow from reduced subsidy.
The government was already in the process of liberalising the exchange rate. Major economies are in the process of reducing their interest rates while our central bank is entering a tightening cycle. This should reduce the pressure on our exchange rate.
However, the interim administration manages to stabilise the economy it might create a culture of military coups to solve political challenges.