They could be heroes
The spectre of uniformed saviours once again stalks Bangladesh
On 15 August 1975, the people of Bangladesh woke with a radio announcement that the country was under indefinite curfew and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was dead. Upon hearing the news, Major General Ziaur Rahman, the second highest ranking officer in the army, calmly told his juniors that while the president was dead, there was a vice president and the constitution should be upheld. Had the then army chief and other senior officers shared Zia’s mettle and rallied around Syed Nazrul Islam, history would have been different.
This was not the first time that Ziaur Rahman had recognised that the armed forces should be subordinated to a civilian, constitutional government. His first radio speech in March 1971 claimed that he was heading a provisional government to lead the war against Pakistan. Recognising that a civilian government would have greater legitimacy, his subsequent iconic speech claimed that the government of Bangladesh was being headed by Mujib. Zia’s radio broadcast was to be retrospectively subsumed into the Mujibnagar Declaration of Independence, which affirmed the supremacy of the civilian political leadership over the soldiers spearheading the armed resistance against Pakistan.
Indeed, not just Zia, but the other commanders of the Mukti Bahini too accepted the political leadership. Many a country has been born through a violent conflict. And in many other cases a charismatic leader had assumed power with some form of popular mandate. It is hard to think of a case where the armed men voluntarily lowered their guns and give up a seat at the table of power once victory was achieved, deferring to a leader who chose to remain absent from the battlefield. Except Bangladesh, that is, where the political power in December 1971 did not emanate from the barrel of a gun.
Of course, political power returned to those wielding guns in August 1975, and soldiers eventually put Zia at the helm by November.
Consistent with his actions in 1971, and his counsel in August 1975, Ziaur Rahman worked towards suborning the military to a constitutional order. He believed that his transformation into a civilian politician would gradually establish a political culture that would avoid the sort of crises that could lead to coups. He also believed that his own military background, coupled with more resources for the army, would dissuade any potential coupmaker.
Whatever one thinks of his politics, it’s self-evident that Zia was a failure when it comes to demilitarisation. Firstly, Zia was killed in a failed coup — not the first one attempted against his regime. More importantly, his very success as a politician has resulted in ambitious generals attempting to become a national saviour once every decade.
Zia’s successor as the army chief turned military strongman turned civilian politician was of course HM Ershad. He did tame the army, faced no coup threat, and the only time the army disobeyed him was when he asked it to put down a student led urban uprising. That uprising ended his regime. It seems that the Bangladesh army would rather accept civilian leadership than use large scale violence against civilians.
And that makes sense. The army rank and file is drawn from the same socioeconomic class whence the university students come from. The captain or lieutenant in charge of firing on the demonstrations would quite likely have a cousin in his target. Since the Ershad regime had no ideological foundation that the army was motivated to defend, it was always vulnerable to popular uprising.
In August 2007, a similar event played out (albeit in a much smaller scale), dooming Moeen U Ahmed’s political ambitions (of course, Moeen’s ambitions and abilities were dwarfed by those of Ershad, let alone Zia).
This gives us another way to demilitarise — through protests and uprisings. The thing is, history suggests that successful uprisings are rare, and even the seemingly successful ones carry with them unintended consequences. And in Bangladeshi context, protests may lead to generals’ downfall, but they don’t seem to stop other generals’ rise.
Of course, Bangladesh has been under firm civilian control since January 2009. And yet, the spectre of a uniformed saviour might be looming yet again. Why?
Here is how Taluqder Maniruzzaman concluded his Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath:
Zia has gone through an almost Darwinian process of selection through the war with Pakistan and coups in Bangladesh. He has never denigrated politicians as a class – which is itself typical of the present day military rulers of many third-world countries. On the contrary, he has shown adroit political skills in bringing together diverse political groups and accumulating political power though coalition-building. However, Zia will have to work within the overall political milieu in Bangladesh. For the long-run development of viable civilian institutions, the other political leaders of Bangladesh would also have to practise self-restraint, conduct themselves according to the rules framed for political participation and forsake their penchant for “winner-take-all” games.
That book was published in 1980. Zia is long gone. But that last sentence applies to none more so than the person ruling Bangladesh since January 2009. Prime Minister Hasina Wajed’s refusal to practise self-restraint and conduct herself according to the rules framed for political participation and her penchant for “winner-take-all” games is putting Bangladesh on, to use Avinash Paliwal’s words, an inflection point.
Paliwal mentions a number of factors that might be weighing on the generals’ calculations — some more pertinent than others once one thinks through them.
First, should things become violent in the streets as the opposition parties ramp up their call for an election-time government, the army might decide to step in, whether because of some generals’ ambition to save the nation or out of a sincere desire to avoid further bloodshed.
However, there is perhaps less to this factor than initially meets the eye.
With the advent of the Rapid Action Battalion, the army as such need not be at risk of being put into the political fray. There is no need for any general to face the dilemma Lt Gen Nuruddin Khan faced in December 1990 when Ershad asked him to use violence against civilian population to save his regime.
For example, think about the events of Matijheel in May 2013. The army rank-and-file is drawn from the same socioeconomic class whence the Hefazot gatherers came. Any given captain in charge of firing on the gathering might well have had a cousin in his target. The thing is, the army was never called to disperse the mob in Shapla Chattar. Rather, it was a particular unit of RAB, under a particular Lt Colonel, that was deployed. That officer, of course, proved his loyalty to the regime and has since then been promoted to a Major General, and is currently in charge of spying on the countries’ citizens to safeguard the regime.
More generally, the routine RAB posting of majors and colonels act as a screening device for the regime to determine which officers and their men can be trusted for ‘sensitive’ assignments. The whole army need never be involved in any political mess.
That is, a worsening political crisis is, in and of itself, no reason to expect a military coup.
Paliwal’s last factor — the possible Indian reaction — might not be as relevant as it first appears either.
Palliwal makes an incendiary claim that during the BDR mutiny of 2009, it was Indian pressure that stopped the army from swiftly putting an end to bloodshed. I am sure he has his impeccable sources. However, his characterisation that Gen Moeen U Ahmed had Napoleonic ambition in February 2009, and the army had returned to barracks after that mutiny, are less-than-accurate if not flat-out-wrong. Moeen did indeed have ambitions, which is why he took advantage of the political crisis ahead of the election scheduled in January 2007, arrested and exiled politicians, and openly talked about a new political order. The thing is, Moeen failed, had to allow an election, respect the results, hand over power to Hasina Wajed, and return to the barracks in January 2009. By the time of the BDR mutiny, Moeen was a defeated man who was in no position to challenge Hasina. Failure to recognise to recognise this nuance makes one question Palliwal’s otherwise sound analysis.
Coming to the present, suppose that the generals, for whatever reason, did decide to topple Hasina Wajed from power. Exactly what would India do? Send Pathan and Tiger to Dhaka?
I jest, of course. India has, of course, planned or acted to prevent coups overseas — Operation Lal Dora and Operation Flowers Are Blooming could well be filmed one day starring the ageing Khans. But military actions to thwart a coup in Dhaka?
The balances of military power between the two countries was tilted far, far more favourably to India in 1975, and yet there was no intervention, even when leftist radicals tried to kidnap the Indian High Commissioner. If the generals were indeed determined to take power, India’s support for Hasina would likely not be a sufficient deterrent.
So, if political violence is not sufficient to warrant a coup, and Indian response is not a sufficient deterrant against one, then what might matter?
Enter Paliwal’s other factors — the insitutional interests of the army, and the generals’ professionalism in contrast with controversies surrounding regime insiders such as Major General Tarique Siddique.
Way back in 2015, Victor Mallet explained in a Financial Times article that the army has been ‘funded to forget‘ about coups. The FT is paywalled, so let me quote the choice bits:
“Zia’s strategy is to bring in the army,” says one leading Bangladeshi analyst who asks not to be named for fear of reprisals. “You ratchet up the level of violence to the extent that the army feels compelled to restore order.
“Hasina, understanding that . . . is giving [the military], all sorts of toys — buying them MiGs or submarines and allocating cantonments [residential areas]. She is creating an appetite [within] the army that future governments will find very hard to feed. Nothing they are asking for is being denied.”
Bangladesh is buying subsidised weapons from China and Russia and its annual defence budget has doubled in the past six years to more than $2bn, although official defence spending remains a fairly modest 1.4 per cent of gross domestic product.
The government says the 260,000-strong army has no interest staging a coup d’état and benefits from being the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping forces around the world. “This is something the army wouldn’t like to tarnish,” says HT Imam, a minister and one of Ms Hasina’s advisers.
……
Mahbubur Rahman, an opposition BNP leader and a former army chief, defends the army’s professionalism and says it would nowadays intervene in politics only out of patriotism and if national security was threatened.
But he also agrees that the Hasina government is providing financial and other inducements to keep the armed forces on its side, not least through a generous policy of promotions for senior officers. When he was army chief there was only one lieutenant-general — himself — whereas now there are six, he says.
“This government has really expanded the army, by manpower, firepower, and equipment. There are a lot of welfare projects for the army,” he says. “The pay is better.”
Like some of the BNP’s leaders, independent analysts have concluded that Ms Hasina has outwitted Ms Zia — at least for the time being — partly by co-opting every branch of the security forces from the main military intelligence agency to the Rapid Action Battalion, an elite anti-crime and anti-terror unit accused of atrocities against the opposition.
The economic difficulties, compounded by the regime’s policy mis-steps as well as squabbling among the oligarchs, may well upset this order. As Paliwal puts it:
If Hasina’s actions threaten to harm the army’s image in truth or myth, then the latter might justify intervention to protect institutional professionalism and, paradoxically, in the name of constitutional integrity.
Paliwal’s analysis leads to conclusions that are simultaneously grounds for despair and hope.
Let’s cover the downside first. Considering the surveillance powers at the regime’s disposal, any coup would be an extremely risky venture where the failure might been not-even-a-funeral is granted to the families of any would-be-coupmaker. It is elementary that greater the risk, higher the rewards must be to justify action. No matter how they couch it, would the generals really take the trouble to topple the current regime to uphold ‘contitutional integrity’? Would they not be tempted to hang around for years? Would Bangladesh be better served by replacing a corrupt, brutal, civilian dictatorship with a military junta?
Against that gloomy thought are the precedence of Ziaur Rahman’s 1971 actions and his 1975 counsel — indeed uphold the constitutional integrity, allow the politicians to form a government after a free and fair election at the earliest feasible date, and then return to the cantonment.
The army could, indeed, be heroes.
Will they?
One hopes that we don’t have to find out.
Dhaka after the first coup
And after the last one.
Previous posts on coups in Bangladesh:
Further readings
মারুফ মল্লিক, 7 Nov 2022
Breaking down Pathaan, the most popular movie in the world
Swati Sharma, 10 February 2023
Raza Rumi, 27 May 2023
Road to Democracy, 3 June 2023
Economist, 7 Aug 2023