Slouching towards normalcy
100 days of the interim government
Ending nearly three days of uncertainty after Sheikh Hasina had fled in the face of a mass popular uprising, Professor Yunus formed an interim government on 8 August 2024. One hundred days have passed since, and an interim verdict on the government’s performance would perhaps find it is performing adequately and the country is slowly returning to normalcy. However, any reasonable assessment would also find the government faces a significant political challenge.
Of course, any such assessment is inherently subjective. The administration did not — indeed, could not possibly have — issue(d) a 100-day key performance indicator checklist against which we could mark them. However, Prof Yunus himself and several advisors have repeatedly stressed two sets of objectives: first, justice for the July massacre as well as the abuses of the fallen regime; and second, lasting reforms to prevent a return of despotism, followed or accompanied by elections. In addition, there are two implicit objectives: day-to-day running of the state; and managing the political transition from despotism to democracy.
In what follows, I have attempted to assess how the government has been performing against each of these objectives.
Let’s start with the day-to-day functioning of the government.
No one in our history — including the Mujibnagar cabinet that returned to a war-ravaged country in December 1971 — had a worse starting point than the current interim government. I have said this many times, but it is worth repeating for it stresses the point: the central bank governor had fled the country after the previous regime fell, the Imam of the national mosque ran away, the police force and civilian law enforcement agency melted away — such was the magnitude of the collapse.
The Awami League leaders used to say that hundreds of thousands would be killed by their enemies if Hasina were toppled. In similar circumstances in other parts of the world hundreds if not thousands are killed in retribution. Against that, Bangladesh had not in fact descended into anarchy. Yes, the law and order situation remains patchy, with the military having to maintain order across the country because the police force is still non-existent in many places. But there are visible signs of progress.
The government has had to deal with multiple shocks and threats — a devastating flood, sporadic communal and sectarian violence, labour unrest, to name a few. The fact that none of this has, thus far, descended into widespread unrest is to be noted. It means the government is, with help from various stakeholders, performing.
Hasina left behind an economic mess. An average person does not care about the intricacies of macroeconomic management. They see high prices and stagnating income — and it’s not a solace to them that these are Hasina’s fault and it will take a long time for things to turn around.
Nonetheless, the government’s performance on the economy has been particularly strong. A full-blown banking collapse has been avoided — a major success. Taka has been stable against the dollar, and inflation is expected to moderate. The energy sector plunder is being systematically redressed. Economic institutions are being reformed. With the notable exception of labour unrest — which needs to be better managed — the overall performance on the economy is well more than adequate.
Finally, the government has been successful in resetting relationships with the world. There is goodwill towards Bangladesh from all governments, except of course that of India. But even with New Delhi, the message has been credibly sent that Hasina will not return to power.
Yes, there are rooms to improve on each of these areas, and the ones not mentioned. But overall, the interim government is performing as far as the day-to-day management of the state is concerned.
It is harder to judge the next objective, that of justice, which involves three elements: rehabilitation of victims and their families; trial of Hasina and her top cronies and minions; and reconciliation and healing.
While members of the government have claimed that rehabilitation of the victims and their families — treatment of the injured, support for the martyrs’ families and so on — is its top priority, has the performance been adequate? Only a few days ago the injured activists had to resort to street protests. This is not a good situation. The government may be performing, but the performance is perhaps not adequate!
There are visible signs of progress on the trial front. The United Nations has been involved in assessing the magnitude of the July massacre and aftermath. A trial process has been set up. Commissions have been set up to unearth abuses such as illegal abduction. Against that, there are phony charges brought by local opportunists, and the government is struggling to manage such shenanigans.
One hopes that the long arm of the law will get Hasina from her safehouse in New Delhi, not to mention her cronies and minions. One can also be cynical and note that most fallen despots never face justice. I tend to be in the latter category and have little expectation that we will get to hold Hasina and her thugs to account for their crimes. And without justice, how can there be reconciliation?
But this is for the future. For now, the government is performing on the trial front.
Overall then, on the justice objective, the government is performing but can do much better.
Moving on to the next objective — that of reforms and restoration of democracy — the picture is clearer, and the verdict is that the government is performing but it is way too soon to see the results.
The government has announced, and is following through on, a reform roadmap. In addition to various task forces and white papers, commissions have been set up to explore the constitution, the election process, corruption, public administration, the police, the judiciary, health system, labour, gender, and the environment.
These bodies are seeking submissions from the public as well as stakeholders. They are expected to provide recommendations by the end of the year. These recommendations are then to be discussed by the government and implementing stakeholders. The constitution commission is, of course, the biggest ticket one, the implementing stakeholders being the political parties.
The elections will follow the discussions between the government and stakeholders, particularly the political parties, on the implementation of the reforms.
It is too soon to tell what the commissions would recommend, let alone how the discussions will play out. But the interim government has definitely performed on the reform front thus far.
However, where the government can do much better in its last objective — that of political management. The problem is compounded by the fact that the government does not admit it is fundamentally a political government, conflating political with partisan.
Let’s unpack this. The caretaker governments of 1991, 1996 and 2001 were non-partisan and apolitical — each had one specific task, hold a free and fair election within 90 days. All the political questions about who would form the government after the election and what they would do — these were not the caretakers’ concerns. The ‘army-backed caretaker government’ installed after the January 2007 coup — the so-called 1/11 regime — was non-partisan but was openly involved in political games — the so-called minus-2 attempts.
The current government has styled itself as interim. Yunus and his advisors have repeatedly said they have been put to power by the students and people who toppled the Hasina despotism. That is, this is a political government. It’s not a partisan government. It’s not a national government composed of established political parties. But this does not make the government apolitical.
Since the government is inherently political, and it derives its legitimacy from those it governs, it has to respond to the citizens’ concerns. And currently the only mechanism for the government to even hear the concerns is protests — online or on the streets. This is a volatile, combustible state of affairs at best! And the situation is worsened by the government’s opaque relationship with its political ‘appointors’ — the self-styled organisers of the July uprising, currently grouped in the Students Against Discrimination and Nagorik Committee. Thus we have the circus of three new advisors being announced, and then a social media storm of protests by those Yunus claimed to be his appointees!
Given the reform roadmap announced, the best outcome would be for these two bodies to become a formal political party at the soonest, followed by student council and local government elections this winter and spring. These elected bodies would provide a mechanism for citizens to express their concerns without taking to streets.
This is a political act, and the government is yet to show it can perform.
Congratulations to the three newest advisors. They are all excellent choices and I express full solidarity with each of them.
Further reading
Bangladesh Economic Data Distortion Hasina Government
Kallol Mustafa, 2 Sep 2024
PayPal in Bangladesh: What’s holding it back?
Imran Hossain, 12 Oct 2024
July-August Protests Impact on Bangladesh Economy
Fahmida Khatun, 15 Oct 2024
Alone in the Dark: The Nightmare of Bangladesh’s Secret Underground Prison
Mujib Mashal and Shayeza Walid, 17 Oct 2024
Bangladesh Political Shifts and Business Impact
Refayet Ullah Mirdha, 26 Oct 2024
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আশিক চৌধুরী, 26 Oct 2024
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