Of jamdanis and sherwanis

The time has come for Tarique Rahman to exercise leadership and guide his party through the reform process

The Consensus Commission process appears to be entering the final quarter. As this piece is being written, three significant issues remain outstanding.

For each, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party finds itself in a curious position: they appear to be the main obstructionist party, even when they have genuinely good reasons to oppose the reform proposal, with their counterproposal potentially being worse than the status quo and a departure from their previous positions, and most curiously, when better solutions exist that could benefit the party politically as well as being genuinely good reforms.

The party leadership could cut through the morass and grasp the reform mettle, but it might mean taking on the party machine. The key question is whether the leadership is up for the task.

Ladies First

Let’s start with the issue of reserved seats for female MPs. At the time of independence, there were 15 such seats, which were raised to 30 and then 50. Until the early 2000s, the reserved female MPs were elected by the 300 directly elected MPs, and the incumbent party and allies had captured all the reserved seats.

While BNP had promised direct elections for female MPs in the early 2000s, they backtracked and introduced a new system where the reserved female MPs mirror the parties’ share of the 300 general seats.

Fast forward to the present day. While most political parties want 100 directly elected female MPs, BNP wants to stick to the status quo method to select 100 female MPs.

Now, smashing the glass ceiling of female participation in politics is a goal everyone agrees with. Is there any evidence that reserved seats are the most effective way to achieve this? Are there better ways, such as mandatory nomination of female MPs to a certain number of seats, or certain number of party positions?

There is a literature on this that BNP, and indeed all the parties, could draw from and propose steps that don’t require constitutional amendment and could be implemented through an ordinance. That is, there are reform options that are available for implementation right away.

But the Consensus Commission process has found itself stuck in a situation where there are two options on the table: directly elected or selected hundred female MPs, and BNP is finding itself on the regressive side.

Back in the 1980s, veteran writer Shafiq Rehman dubbed the female MPs a set of jewelry. With inflation, perhaps we cannot afford a set of hundred pieces of jewelry, but under BNP’s proposal we maybe looking at 100 sets of jamdani -- selected MPs who have no direct connection with the electorate, are totally beholden to the party bosses, and are likely to add little to either gender equity or a better functioning parliament.

Moving on Up

Moving on to the issue of the upper house, again there is agreement on a hundred-member chamber, but BNP’s proposal is to have the upper house mirror the lower house in seat composition.

Now, BNP was the first major party to propose an upper house, nearly a decade ago. Its stated motivation was to laterally involve into politics individuals of accomplishment in arenas other than politics. However, if the upper house has the similar composition of seats as the lower house, then how exactly will these accomplished upper house members contribute to politics?

By virtue of the majority in the lower house, the incumbent party will exercise its democratic mandate and form the government. The executive will govern and the lower house will legislate. What is there for the upper house to do when it can only rubber stamp decisions made by others?

That is, BNP’s stated position is to have 100 sherwanis to accompany 100 jamdanis!

Of course, the upper house could have a genuinely important function if it is chosen proportionate to the votes won by parties in the lower house. In this case, the composition of two houses would differ. Even if the legislative power is rested in the lower house, as long as there are upper house opposition members with numbers to initiate a hearing or hold public review, the governing party will need capable individuals to defend the incumbent’s position.

Indeed, the upper house could play a crucial role in vetting the appointments to crucial constitutional positions such as the Election Commission. And this brings us to the third issue where disagreement remains, where BNP has strong grounds to oppose the proposed reform, and where it is failing to provide a better alternative even though it is committed to the spirit of the reform!

Constitutionally Speaking

The Riaz Commission’s proposal for appointments is through a National Constitution Council or similar body, where the Chief Justice or their delegate could play a crucial role. This is highly problematic for a couple of reasons.

First, nominations to these posts should remain the prerogative of the incumbent, and not an extra-parliamentary body. The legislature should vet the nominees. This is the common practice in much of the democratic world, and is indeed something proposed in BNP’s 31-Points.

Second, it is not at all clear why the judiciary would be involved in these appointment process in any capacity. Indeed, by potentially leaving the casting ballot to the Chief Justice or their delegate, the whole process would likely incentivize political parties to further politicize the judiciary.

A much better solution is to have parliamentary committees vet the individuals nominated by the executive through televised confirmation hearings. Opposition members in a proportionately represented upper house could play a vital role in these hearings. And the government members of the upper chamber would have to defend the nominees. Even if the opposition didn’t have the numbers to block a nominee, they could raise enough public backlash through such confirmation hearing process against a really egregious nominee such that the incumbent would not risk such nominations in the first place.

That is the kind of transformative reform that is possible.

Why then is BNP not pushing these? Why is it not accepting directly elected female MPs when it is likely to win most of these seats by virtue of being the only party with enough bench strength to put up such candidates? Why is it not proposing alternative mechanisms and falling back on the model of 100 jamdanis? Why is it not supporting a proportionately represented upper house with vetting responsibilities, which are in line with Tarique Rahman’s stated visions?

A cynical answer might be that the BNP leadership does not want to bridle its power. But that is perhaps too simplistic. A more nuanced take is that genuine reforms could hurt the powers and prestige of the local party bosses who tend to become MP.

To win a seat in the parliament -- that is, the 300 general seats in the lower house -- requires one to be locally grounded politician, with a history in the area (personal or through family), financial clout, and street cred. The responsibilities of an MP under the current system are not in Dhaka, but in their locality -- an MP is expected to cater to their constituents’ manifold needs. And with those responsibilities come the power of patronage. Potential BNP MPs have honed their political career under this setting.

Directly elected female MPs also directly challenge their local pre-eminence. Further, while they do the hard work of electioneering and winning the vote, under a PR upper house, people in Dhaka could get the limelight and become potentially nationally important figures.

And they themselves don’t want to be involved in committee work in Dhaka -- no one wins a re-election because of those meetings! In contrast, 100 jamdanis and sherwanis do nothing to threaten the powers of local party bosses.

It is easy to see why people who are actually involved in BNP’s local politics -- as opposed to the senior leaders -- who might be the real blockage against these reform ideas. Indeed, this is nothing specific to BNP. Had the other political parties been large enough to have national presence like BNP, they would likely have had the exact same internal dynamics.

So, how does BNP come out of this morass? Only through a top-down leadership decision. If Tarique Rahman is serious about ushering in transformative change, then now is the time for him to step up and accept a PR upper house with vetting responsibilities, and provide a better alternative than selected female MPs.

First published at the Counterpoint.

Further reading

• ঢালাও আসামির নেপথ্যে বাণিজ্য, বিদ্বেষ, দ্বন্দ্ব

  মাহমুদুল হাসান, 27 April 2025

• After the revolution, Bangladesh is hoping to reform

  The Economist, 15 May 2025

• ইউনূস-তারেকের ‘সন্তুষ্টি’তে স্বস্তি টেকসই হবে কি

  কামাল আহমেদ, 14 June 2025

• Is Bangladesh ready for a 'credible' election?

  Arafatul Islam, 17 June 2025

• BNP Needs to Play the Long Game

  Asif Shahan, 21 June 2025