Of ideas, actions, and expectations
Three months from Sheikhdown, prospects for a democratic Bangladesh hangs in the balance
Seventeen Moments of Spring is a 1970s Russian TV series set during the last months of the Third Reich. Over 12 episodes, we see SS-Standartenfuhrer Stierlitz — a Soviet agent — thwart a peace negotiation between the Nazi elements and the Americans, preparing the way for the Red Army to capture Berlin. The gripping thriller is not well known in the west, let alone Bangladesh. It is a reminder that there is no single narrative of the Second World War even among the victors: the patriotic Russians defending Stalingrad in hand-to-hand combat, the lonely Britain defiantly refusing to accept peace on Hitler’s term, and the American arsenal for democracy — they are all facts of which many tales are weaved.
Three months on from Sheikh Hasina fleeing Bangladesh, the country’s democratic prospects hang in the balance as different narratives are weaved around the Monsoon Revolution. For some, it was about reasserting a Muslim cultural identity that had been suppressed under the previous regime. Others took it as an opportunity to push Islamist politics. For many, it was the latest round in the fight to restore electoral democracy. For many more, it was rejection of the cronyism and despotism that was the Hasina regime.
Indeed, there isn’t even a consensus on whether the Long July indeed culminated in a revolution. Some take the term literally, believing that what happened on 36 July was indeed a revolution as it is understood in the political science literature. Others, including this scribe, use the term as a proper noun.
These ideas are animating actions and setting expectations in today’s Bangladesh, and the outcome hangs in balance.
In ‘Pakistan: military rule or people’s power?’, Tariq Ali noted that conditions were ripe for a revolution in 1968-69 as student-led protests turned into a popular uprising that ended the Ayub Khan regime, but a revolution was not imminent because Pakistan lacked a revolutionary party.
To the extent that the collapse of the state apparatus — as evinced by the fleeing of the central bank governor, or the disintegration of the law enforcement agencies — has been fat greater in 2024, conditions have been even more ripe for a revolution. And yet, the absence of a revolutionary party is as true today as it was 55 years ago.
Let’s listen to Nahid Islam’s demands from Shaheed Minar on 3 Aug.
Goosebumps aside, let me note a few key points. He explicitly calls for not just resignation of Sheikh Hasina but the entire government, justice for all the human rights abuses by the regime, and political reforms to ensure that a regime such as Hasina’s does not return in Bangladesh. Soaked in rain, he asks for storming of Ganabhaban to oust Hasina. And he calls for non-cooperation with the regime, making a distinction that this would not be a Gandhian non-cooperation but one redolent of 1971.
Whether this is a call for revolution will be debated by historians. The actions that Nahid, Mahfuj Alam and other student leaders took in collaboration with Gen Wakar-uz-Zaman and politicians such as Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir and others, and of course, Professor Yunus in the lead up to the speech and in the subsequent days would suggest they aimed to resuscitate and reform the existing Republic rather than proclaim a new one.
Actions that have been taken by the Yunus administration is squarely within the reformist interpretation of Nahid’s call. The interim administration has expressed repeatedly that its tasks are to bring Hasina and her cronies to justice, begin the reform process, and hold and a free and fair election to hand over power to people’s representatives. The administration has repeatedly said it derives its legitimacy from the people in the Long July, but it has also acknowledged that popular mandate as expressed through an election is the ultimate arbiter of popular mandate.
Of course, its immediate tasks had been to simply restore the state machinery — law enforcement and civilian bureaucracy — while avoiding a banking crisis and communal violence and deal with a flood.
Considering the sheer challenges before them, the interim administration has done far better than might have been expected.
A reform process has commenced, with six commissions already working and five more being formed. The commissions are consulting the stakeholders and will report by the end of the year, or shortly thereafter, with recommendations that will be discussed by the government and political parties in 2025. Implementation of these reforms will reflect those discussions, with some undertaken by the interim administration and others left for the elected government.
When judging the administration’s performance, bureaucracy is a factor that is seldom appreciated. As anyone who has ever worked in any large organization would know, the middle management sees its role as doing as little as possible. This is true in even the most advanced democracies — there is a reason why the old BBC series Yes Minister / Yes Prime Minister remains a classic! It is compounded in Bangladesh by the fact that people in these middle management positions —those in their 40s and 50s with 15+ years of experience — are overwhelmingly Hasina’s hacks and crooks. It is a Herculean task to just find professionals with a modicum of integrity into these positions, never mind asking them to implement any reform! Nahid had asked for citizens’ non-cooperation with the Hasina regime. The Yunus administration is bedeviled by a silent non-cooperation by the bureaucracy.
Of course, there is room for improvement as far as the government’s performance is concerned. Three months into office, the Chief Advisor would do well to reshuffle and expand his team. For example, Salahuddin Ahmed is effectively doing five jobs at the moment, and it is unfathomable why there isn’t a full-time Commerce Advisor.
However, nothing the government has done, or can reasonably be expected to do, portend a revolution. If you say you wanted a revolution, well you know, you can count the Yunus administration out!
The revolutionaries are surely disappointed. Not a day goes by that one does not hear from Mahmudur Rahman, Farhad Mazhar or Pinaki Bhattacharya that the formation of the interim government under the existing constitution was a mistake. To these Bolsheviks of Bangladesh, Yunus should have assumed Presidency and proclaim a second republic from Shaheed Minar. Indeed, Students Against Discrimination has in fact demanded that the reform process be abandoned in favour of precisely such a proclamation.
Well, if the Bolshevik demand is yet to be met, it is perhaps because there is no revolutionary party. Various factions — not just students but random folks with random demands —have been threatening violence to get their way: burning this office, shutting down that event, boycotting the other newspaper and so on. This stuff, of course, creates instability, perhaps even anarchy. If things get truly out of hand, perhaps the government will be compelled to junk the whole reform process and call an immediate election. Or alternatively, the military might step in. Either way, absent a party or organisation, it is hard to see a revolution coming!
And there is no concrete sign of a credible new political organisation, though there are speculations that various Muslim nationalist and Islamist factions are coalescing around Mahmudur Rahman. Whether this turns into a revolutionary party remains to be seen.
That is, as things stand, Bolshevism has little prospect in Bangladesh, even though their adventurism could well derail the whole reform process unless the Mensheviks step up.
In the context of today’s Bangladesh, the Mensheviks are to be found in the largest political party — the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. It is now well understood that the BNP grassroots activists were actively in the streets from mid-July and that the party declined an invitation to lead a national government in early August. As a democratic political party, BNP’s stance makes perfect sense. After denouncing Hasina for three rigged elections, how could they possibly join a government without electoral mandate? More importantly, electoral democracy is the very raison-d’etre of BNP!
Crucially though, BNP has acknowledged the necessity of reforms to ensure that a regime such as Hasina’s does not return in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the Citizens’ Committee that was formed by the allies of Mahfuj Alam could still transform itself into a political party. If the reform process is to succeed, it is the Mensheviks in the country’s largest party and the likely newest one who will have to do the hard work!
Will the young leaders who delivered us from Hasina’s despotism be able to organise themselves politically to implement what Nahid had called for on 3 August?
Further reading
Sayrat Salekin, 30 Jan 2024
Mustafizur Rahman Khan, 27 Aug 2024
$450m reserve drop on 11 Aug: Cover-up for Islami Bank misconduct?
Majumder Babu, 3 Sep 2024
July Revolution: The unmasking of the snowflakes
Omar Nasif Abdullah, 12 Sep 2024
How Can Bangladesh Recover Assets Stolen During Awami League Rule?
AKM Wahiduzzaman, 26 Sep 2024
Bangladeshi stocks back on global investors’ radar
Mahfuz Ullah Babu & Ahsan Habib Tuhin 10 October, 2024
Bangladesh is discussing a proportional representation poll system – but some say it’s impractical
Faisal Mahmud, 18 Oct 2024
‘Money is no problem’, but debt is
Shadique Mahbub Islam, 18 Oct 2024 (I was interviewed for this piece)
বাংলাদেশে গণতন্ত্র প্রতিষ্ঠায় ভারত এগিয়ে আসেনি
Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury interviewed, 24 Oct 2024
কর্ণফুলী টানেলের সমস্যা | কর্ণফুলী টানেল: বাজে পরিকল্পনার সর্বোত্তম উদাহরণ
মোহাম্মদ সুমন, রেজাউল করিম বায়রন, 27 Oct 2024