Live and let die

Bangladesh might not see democracy any time soon

Mammoth protest rallies at a time of cost of living pressures unseen in decades — that might be the classic setting for the fall of totalitarian governments, but there are good reasons for the regime in Dhaka to feel secure. In a few months it will be Ramadan plus summer, and then will pour the monsoon. Whatever political momentum the democratic opposition has built up in recent months could be lost by March.

Does BNP have the ability to restart the protests in the autumn of 2023? Maybe. Will it have the street wherewithal to thwart another one-sided election in winter? Probably not. Can it convince the ‘bastions of power’ in Dhaka to switch side?

Let’s see.

The regime of course needs the loyalty of the civil-military bureaucracy to run the country in general, and actually rig the election in particular. In the aftermath of Shahbag-Shapla upheavals in 2013, the bureaucracy, and the broader urban affluent society, was extremely apprehensive about political instability. In the lead up to the 2018 election, they were handsomely bribed with four-five fold payrises. Neither of those factors are at play currently. Payrises particularly are not on the cards at all given the macroeconomic situation.

But all that means is that the civil-military bureaucracy / security apparatus may not be sticking by Hasina Wajed if the going gets tough. There is no reason, however, to expect anyone to organize anything pro-actively.

What about the geopolitical context?

Countries that care about Bangladesh — India, China, and the US and its allies — all want the same thing: stability. No one wants chaos in a country of 160 million Muslims. However, the main threat to stability has changed significantly. In the past, the real or perceived threat came from radical, militant Islam, and the regime was considered the safest guard against it.

The biggest risk now, however, is the economy.

Of course, the economy could completely implode. Balance of payments difficulties could mount. Inflation could spiral out. Key oligarchs could pull the plug. Or, the economy might muddle through on the back of exports and remittance revival.

Against that, what is BNP’s thinking?

These meetings and rallies have reminded everyone that BNP still exists. Its ability to attract the massive crowd means if there were to be a free and fair election, BNP could still win in a landslide. It’s also worth stressing that these meetings and rallies are happening without Khaleda Zia or Tarique Rahman. People who have been active and visible are old men like Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir or Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury. With the 10-point demand and 27-point framework for reform, there is a forward agenda that will keep the party relevant when Mrs Zia and these old men depart the scene.

But none of this actually means BNP is in any position to make enough trouble in the streets for Mrs Wajed. In fact, the party is arguably very keen  to avoid violence — images of burning buses in Dhaka street is not something anyone wants to be associated with! Instead, BNP seems to be keen to portray itself as a liberal democratic party committed to pluralism.

That is, both the regime and BNP seem to be playing a tactical game of running out the clock and waiting for the tie-breaker (yes, we are still in the World Cup frame of mind).

What happens if the economy sours significantly? What if there is a spontaneous street outburst like the safe street protests? In a high inflation environment, things could go out of hand very quickly. Is it conceivable that the ‘bastions of power’ could switch side because there is no longer any bribe, and BNP is not that scary anymore?

Of course, BNP will probably be very happy with a repeat of the 1/11 experience. For example, a caretaker regime headed by, say, Reza Kibria could facilitate safe exit for the prime minister and her close associates, address much of the 10-points demand, and hold a free and fair election in 2024-25. BNP could commit to a national government, and deliver on the 27-points after that election. That maybe the ideal scenario for BNP.

But here is the thing —knowing what happened to Moeen U Ahmed, will anyone risk their neck to topple the regime do so just to hand over power to Tarique Rahman a few years later? If the civil military establishment, with active support of the oligarchy, wants to step in, will they not do so with a view towards sticking around for the long haul? But is anything like that possible without an Ayub Khan like figure in the top brass with a big picture gameplan?

The regime might be confident that there is no such figure lurking around out there. And therefore, when it comes to democracy in Bangladesh, perhaps 2023 will be another year to live and let die.

Further reading

• Where to Look for Aid: New Ideas for Third World

  Bernard D Nossiter, 29 Aug 1980

• What is Islam? The highly contested debate about ‘Islam’ in Bangladeshi politics and culture

  Mubashar Hassan, 6 Jun 2022

• Remembering the life and times of Akbar Ali Khan: A public intellectual par excellence

  Nasif Tanjim, 10 Sep 2022

• Tens of thousands protest in Bangladesh to demand resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina

  Vedika Sud and Yong Xiong, 11 Dec 2022

• One of the world's most congested cities just opened its first metro line

Heather Chen, 29 Dec 2022

• যেসব ঘটনা ও রেকর্ডে ২০২২ সালকে মনে রাখবে বাংলাদেশ

  ফয়েজ আহমদ তৈয়্যব, 31 Dec 2022