Liberty or death

Speculations about the War

But suppose there was no direct Indian military intevention. How might things have played out? Would Bangladesh have attained liberty eventually? If so, how? Or would the Bangladesh movement have died? If so, when?

One can argue multiple ways about this.

By the end of the monsoon, Pakistan was near bankruptcy. It faced international opprobrium. Pakistani forces were stretched, tired, demoralised. They were hit by Mukti Bahini guerrillas in broad daylight in Dhaka and other urban areas, while much of the countryside was never really in their control. In November, Mukti Bahini formations engaged Pakistanis in co-ordinated, set piece battles. As long as the Indians were providing arms and logistical support, could the Mukti Bahini have eventually beaten the Pakistanis?

Perhaps. 

But then again, perhaps not. 

Biafran leader Emeka Ojukwu was eventually forgiven, and died an old man in Nigeria. Hard to imagine the Yahya regime being so generous with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Let’s say Mujib didn’t live to see 1972.

Without the hope of Mujib’s return, how long could the Mujibnagar government remain united? As it is, Khondoker Mostaq Ahmed was plotting against Tajuddin Ahmed, who faced an assassination attempt by the Mujib Bahini also tried to assassinate Tajuddin. Meanwhile, Ziaur Rahman wanted a war council, but some of the radical sector commanders disliked the conventional tactics of MAG Osmani. Then there were the leftists, of both Moscor and Beijing varieites.

Without the Indian army installing him in Dhaka, could Tajuddin prevail over the disparate elements? After all, Bengalis don’t exactly have a reputation for unity.

Pakistan army has faced global opprobrium, and its has been a nearly bankrupt country, for decades. And yet, like the creature in the Alien series, it survives. 

Autumn, winter, and spring are the seasons conducive for warfare in Bangladesh. Had there been no war on the western front, perhaps Yahya would have sent a few more divisions to the east by December. Perhaps that reinforcement would have been enough to crush the Bangladesh resistance.

On the other hand, had Mujibnagar and Mukti Bahini survived the winter and spring, surely by the monsoon of 1972 the Pakistan army would have been at the breaking point.

Pakistan army’s task would have been made more difficult had ZA Bhutto run out of patience.

Had the army ‘saved’ East Pakistan, Yahya would have had a stronger bargaining position against Bhutto. But if the war continued into a second monsoon, it’s quite likely Bhutto would have launced street agitations for ‘democracy’.

Meanwhile, even if India stopped short of a full-scale march to Dhaka, it had strong reason to not allow Pakistan win. It had decided that 10 million mostly Hindu refugees had to return, and that would have been impossible in any East Pakistan.

Further, India had strong reasons to avoid a prolonged war. Not only did that increase the risk of intra-Bengali conflict, more importantly, it had the potential destabilise entire eastern India.

If direct intervention was not an option, India probably would have armed its chosen faction lot more seriously. Would that faction have been the Mujib Bahini? If so, how would the others — the left as well as the professional soldiers — have responded? Or would India have chosen one of the rebel majors as its favourite?

Perhaps a better trained Mujib Bahini would have captured a part of Khulna and Jessore. Perhaps a better equipped Z-Force would have blockaded Chittagong and prevented any Pakistani reinforcement. Perhaps having forced Yahya to resign, Bhutto would have withdrawn Pakistani troops by mid-1972.

But then what would have happened?

It’s hard to imagine India being able to control the chaos that a liberated Bangladesh would have been.

Almost certainly, various factions — Mujibists, leftists, warlords like Kader Siddiqi, and the remnants of the Razakars — would have been fighting each other as well as the official forces of Mujibnagar. 

If Mujibnagar remained that is.  Perhaps military commanders would have just pushed Tajuddin and Syed Nazrul aside. The real world November 1975 would have looked like a cricket match compared with the multi-sided, kaleidoscopic civil war that would have ensued.

Fifty years ago today, Pakistanis laid down their guns. Two weeks earlier, however, they struck India in the western theatre. Clearly, they didn’t think they could win in the east. And India might have invaded in the east even without the Pakistani air strikes in the west.

Just as well. Because without the Indian invasion, there would have been just more death.